Section B
80 Marks
1. Which model (Cournot, Bertrand) would you think provides a better approximation to each
of the following industries: Oil refining and insurance? Motivate your answer.
[4)
2. Assume that Namibia's telecommunication Industry is represented by the following cost
function. C (q1, q2) = 40 + 10q 1+ 15q2- {3q1q2/2). Where q1 denotes MTC output and q2
represents Telecom Namibia output. Further to this, assume that Ray's average costs (RAC)
adopt A1 = 0.8, A2 = 0.2 production ratio. Use Ray's average cost of multi-product firms to
determine if the telecommunication industry exhibits a global economy or diseconomies of
scale, where . Show all your steps.
[8]
3. Assume an oligopolistic industry with two identical firms (MTC-Namibia & Paratus) with
inverse demand function P = 62 - 2Q and total cost functions , . Where q1 & Cl are the
quantity and cost for MTC-Namibia and q2 & C2 represent quantity & cost for Paratus
respectively. Answer the following questions.
a. Use a Cournot model to determine the equilibrium values of profit and quantities for
each firm.
[10
b. Assume MTC has a first-mover advantage to set prices and Paratus follows. What
are the equilibrium values of profit and quantities for each firm in this case? [8]
c. Use the Lerner index to measure the level of market power in each model. [S]
d. Use answers in a), b), c) and d) to discuss the economic welfare implications of this
duopoly market.
[S]
4. Suppose a local roofing company has market power and faces the following inverse demand
curve. and a marginal cost curve . Where Q is the quantity of roofing jobs and P is the price
in N$. With the use of the diagram, show the dead weight loss from market power at the
firm's profit-maximising level of output.
[10)
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