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MTC812S - Management of Technology - 1st Opp - Nov 2022 |
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nAmlBIA un1VERSITY
OFSCIEnCEAno TECHnOLOGY
FACULTYOF COMMERCE,HUMAN SCIENCESAND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES
QUALIFICATION: BACHELOR OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT HONOURS
QUALIFICATION CODE: 08BBMH
LEVEL: 8
COURSE CODE: MTC821S
COURSE NAME: MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY
SESSION: NOVEMBER 2022
PAPER: 1sr OPPORTUNITY EXAMINATION
DURATION: 3 HOURS
MARKS: 100
EXAMINER(S)
1sr OPPORTUNITYEXAMINATION
DR. CHRISVANZYL
MR. MOSESSHUUYA
MODERATOR: MR. ERNESTMBANGA
INSTRUCTIONS
1. Answer ALL the questions.
2. Write clearly and neatly.
3. Number the answers clearly.
PERMISSIBLEMATERIALS
1. Business calculator
2. The case study
THIS EXAMINATION PAPER CONSISTS OF ..2 PAGES (Including this front page and case study)
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QUESTION 1
(a) Analyse the attached case study "KEEPGOOD SHAPE"and present a detailed case
analysis report containing references to all the relevant strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats. The recommendations should include suggestionsof how the
current innovation strategy could be adapted to provide KEEPGOOD SHAPEwith an
alternative successful innovation strategy. The suggested changes to the current
innovation strategy(s) must be well justified and motivated. The recommendations
should furthermore be very specific about how the strengths and opportunities that
were identified are to be utilized to improve or eliminate the identified weaknessesand
to minimize the effect of the identified threats on the enterprise's performance.
The following report headings need to be included in your final answer:
(a) Executive summary
(b) Introduction
(c) SWOT analysis
(d) Problems/Challenges identification and discussion
(e) Proposed Action Plan
(f) Conclusions
(g) Recommendations
[10 marks]
[5 marks]
[30 marks]
[15 marks]
[20 marks]
[10 marks]
(10 marks]
TOTALMARKS:100
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Keep Good Shape (KGS) - the
expansion dilemma
BikramjitRishiand Vinit Vijay Dani
[I]twas a bright sunny day on March 19, 2021; Megha Bafna, the founder of "Keep Good
Shape" (KGS), a first-generation entrepreneur, was sitting in her home in Pune (India)
reminiscing about her entrepreneurial journey. She had started the KGS venture in
2017 with a seed capital of INR 3,500 (US$53.77) from her savings, initially as a part-time
activity, selling homemade vegetarian salads to people across Pune. Soon KGS, which
effectively was incepted as a passion, grew into a full-fledged business in 2021, with 200
active customers and employed 38 people. Based on a subscription model, KGS served 22
different salads, including customised ones, especially for customers with lifestyle
diseases. Primarily, she grew her organization using social media platforms such as
Facebook and WhatsApp. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic seemed to help her increase
her orders (by volume) by almost 25% in 2020, as healthy meals became people's choice
during these times. Consumers realized that eating healthy became the right way to live a
happy life (Kauer, 2019). Thus, they consumed healthy, gluten-free, low-calorie, hygienic,
baked-not-fried, diabetes-friendly food while ordering online (Progressive Grocer Bureau,
2020).
Bafna's reminiscing was abruptly interrupted as her husband entered the room. She told
him that she wanted to establish a cloud kitchen, as she already had two franchisee outlets
(Pune and Faridabad) and was thinking of business expansion. She thought about having a
system to train franchisees to purchase and cut vegetables and maintain control by
supplying her homemade dressing. However, her husband cautioned her that competition
had increased, and consumer behavior was also changing. Thus, she needed to think twice
before launching a cloud kitchen. He shared a report detailing the changing landscape of
food-tech in India and a list of cloud-kitchen business models to justify himself. Intrigued,
Bafna searched for more information about cloud-kitchen business models. Essentially, she
was confused about selecting the most appropriate cloud-kitchen business model and how
could she manage it?
Beginning of the journey
Bafna was a commerce graduate; before working for KGS full time, she was employed in a
real estate firm for 15 years and had the habit of carrying two to three variants of salads
every day to the office for lunch. As preparing the salad variants was time-consuming, she
often wondered if someone could make such salads for her every day, and she would
gladly buy them. She went through the salad-making process regularly and contemplated
starting a business making salads. She saw this as an opportunity to meet consumers·
needs for salads. Interestingly, she did not have too much competition when she incepted
KGS. She was early to realize that consumers today were becoming more health-conscious
and were beginning to avoid junk and street-side food, especially at the outset of the
Bikramjit Rishi is based at
the School of Management
and Entrepreneurship,
Shiv Nadar University,
Greater Naida, India.
Vinit Vijay Dani is based at
the Department of
Marketing, Vignana Jyothi
Institute of Management,
Hyderabad, India.
Disclaimer: This case is written
solely for educational purposes
and is not intended to represent
successful or unsuccessful
managerial decision making.
The author/s may have
disguised names: financial and
other recognizable information
to protect confidentiality.
DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-09-2021-0301
I I VOL.12 NO.2 2022,pp.1-20,© EmeraldPublishinLgimitedI,SSN2045-0621 EMERALDEMERGINGMARKETSCASESTUDIES PAGE1
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COVID-19 pandemic. She also considered that healthier food was not necessarily tastier
(Van Cuijk, 2015). She wanted to change this perception and thought that a chef could be
creative while preparing healthier and more delicious salads.
She started her venture, Keep Good Shape (KGS), in 2017 in Pune. Pune city was the
fastest-growing industrial hub of India. The city was located in the Maharashtra state of
India. It attracted professionals and students from all over the country due to the presence
of industries, universities and institutions. It witnessed tremendous growth in the past
decade. The migrated population in the city had grown by 100% from 2001 to 2015. The
areas catered by Ms. Bafna in the Pune city had a population of professionals (single and
newly married) and students (who have come to the city for studies). These people were
time-pressed and could not cook food for themselves and were looking for healthy and tasty
options. With a seed capital of INR 3,500 (US$53.77) from her savings, initially, as a "part-
time" business, post her regular employment. She started selling homemade salads to
people across Pune. She reinvested her profits year after year without taking out her initial
investment and finally decided to engage herself full-time in developing KGS.
KGS employed 38 people (Exhibit 1); 15 employees were involved in cutting fruits and
vegetables, 15 others were involved with the delivery process, 4 chefs were helping her
make the salads, 3 executive members were looking after the receipt of the orders passing
them on to the chefs for preparation and 1 unit manager was looking after the overall
management of the business. Most of her employees had an underprivileged background,
especially women. Bafna's objective was to empower women by offering them a chance to
work with her. Most of her employees, especially in the early days of KGS, were not aware of
exotic vegetables like broccoli, lettuce, purple cabbage, red and yellow bell pepper that
were extensively used in preparing salads. Bafna used a regular job rotation mechanism to
keep her employees actively involved in the business. She trained them to choose suitable
vegetables and cut them appropriately. Notably, she selected them based on their time to
commit to the company, readiness to learn and job needs. However, she decided to "dress"
the salads herself, as she felt it was the most critical aspect of her business. All her
employees worked on a daily wage basis.
For her marketing endeavors, Bafna did not opt for the traditional methods of
communication to promote her brand; she used social media, particularly Facebook and
WhatsApp, extensively. She primarily relied on word-of-mouth (WoM) referrals and
customer recommendations to popularise her brand. On Facebook, she specifically relied
on a page called PULA (i.e. Puna Ladies) that had 60,000 women living in Pune as its
members. The "PULA page" offered free promotion once a week to Bafna, helping her
promote her brand.
Bafna began her day at 5 a.m. every day; she went to the market to purchase the
vegetables. She cleaned, cut and dressed the fruits and vegetables to cater to the orders
upon returning home. Her family, including her mother-in-law, husband and son, were
exceptionally supportive; they willingly helped her in her endeavors. Bafna considered her
mother-in-law a source of strength, whose guidance and support helped her sustain her
entrepreneurial venture, especially in the initial days. Her husband, Mr. Sunil, was an
entrepreneur running a travel agency; unfortunately, he was compelled to discontinue his
work due to the pandemic. He was now responsible for recruiting the delivery boys and
ensuring they did their job effectively and efficiently. In short, he was in charge of the
logistics process.
Bafna's customers provided her with positive feedback through SMS and WhatsApp
messages, which motivated her to put in more effort. If there were any customer complaints,
she promptly paid close attention to them and ensured that the complaint was not repeated.
Complete customer satisfaction was her motto and mojo, which effectively helped her grow
the business. She was innovative in her approach; she tried different menus from various
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restaurants, incorporated some of its elements into the salads and ensured that "health"
remained the top priority (Exhibit 2).
She firmly believed that hard work, dedication and consistent quality were the only ways to
succeed in an entrepreneurial venture. Her venture had received consistent orders since its
inception (Exhibit 3). She had created a website to manage the orders. However, most of
the orders came through WhatsApp. Customers ordered daily, weekly or monthly based on
the "type" of subscription.
Bafna was keen to grow her business on pan India basis from her existing two franchisee
outlets (Pune and Faridabad). However, her husband cautioned her against rapid
expansion due to changing consumer behavioral patterns. Then, she decided to do a
thorough study herself to understand and appreciate the nitty-gritty of establishing a cloud-
kitchen business; she also explored various business models that would be the most
suitable.
Bafna earned revenue from salad sale proceeds, commission and sauces sales. From her
franchise partners, she had set a commission of INR 10 (about US$0.13) per salad that the
franchisees sold. Additionally, she charged INR 160 (US$2.15) per kilo of the "special"
sauces delivered to the franchisees by courier.
Food tech in India - an opportunity for unprecedented growth
The lifestyles of Indian consumers (predominantly urban and semi-urban) changed in the
last three decades, including cooking and consumption habits. Consumers started
preferring food ordered online rather than cooked at home. Moreover, the preference for
food shifted to its nutritional value and convenience. These changes forced the food sector
to respond quickly, adapt and meet consumers' needs. Thus. food companies innovated
and came up with new food products, like ready-to-eat products that did not need much
preparation. Salad producers like Bafna faced challenges in making fresh and "innovative"
salads every day with nutritional value. The longer shelf life of salads was a critical customer
expectation. These changes also brought a new dimension to the food industry (i.e. food
tech apps/start-ups). Notably, from 2017 to 2019, these apps increased their spread and
relevance almost six times (PT!, 2020). Interestingly, the average time spent by a consumer
exploring and ordering food online had doubled from 32 min per month in 2017 to 72 min
per month in 2019 (Gahlaut, 2020).
Massive discounts offered by these food tech start-ups to attract customers posed a
significant challenge for the food industry to create a loyal customer base (Bhatnagar et al.,
2020). Several industry experts believed that consumers might revert to home cooking if
these food-tech companies continued to increase their prices. Additionally, the low average
order and repeat orders were other issues these food tech start-ups needed to address
while satisfying their consumers. Most of the business came through cashback and
discount schemes. On their end, even the consumers looked for such deals. Nevertheless,
companies did realize that they should aim for profitability to succeed in the long run.
Indian consumers preferred variety; thus, exploring multiple cuisines was possibly the most
crucial trigger for continued orders, followed by discounts and convenience (PT!, 2020). For
non-users, lack of trust, high delivery charges, quality of food, and lack of customization
acted as barriers (Soni, 2020). Therefore, there was an opportunity to boost growth with
value propositions like deep personalization-targeted marketing, constant value for money,
increased quality assurance and advanced convenience features. Companies tried to
explore the potential of advanced digital analy1ics and machine learning to drive
personalization-targeted marketing and user-specific recommendations. Strong
engagement and partnerships with suppliers backed by big data could increase restaurant
loyalty, negotiation power and higher quality assurance.
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The overall business objectives were to increase user adoption, alleviate barriers and build
deeper relationships with supply networks. The companies tried to address customer
expectations of environment-friendly packaging and value for money (promotions and
discounts) (Singhi et al., 2020). The companies designed and implemented relevant
marketing communication strategies to address the lack of trust among consumers. Several
companies took monetary and community engagement initiatives to drive increased
adoption among non-users.
Moreover, significant trends in this industry introduced players such as Swiggy and
Zomato, which expanded even to the cloud-kitchen model. This model was believed to
reduce rental costs for restaurants and give better flexibility to operate multiple brands
under one umbrella. The industry increased its reach on a pan-India basis, with 500+ cities
enabled by a growing restaurant network. Day by day, consumers were more willing to
experiment by trying different cuisines. A young population and women workforce
contributed to the popularity of food tech apps in metro cities. Consumers preferred
ordering small portions of food to consume them with their home-cooked food (Gupta,
2019).
Cloud-kitchen business models
The recent shift in consumer dining behavior made the cloud-kitchen business model very
popular among start-ups. As Bafna was thinking of expanding her start-up business, she
conducted her research that included the following business models:
The independent cloud-kitchen model: The start-ups were responsible for managing
their costs. In this model, a food start-up did not have any seating arrangements for
customers, and thus, no physical store/location was required. These start-ups primarily
operated from homes. The modus operandi herein: customers placed orders online,
and the start-up had to deliver the same. Notably, this model gained popularity with the
growth of online orders over time.
The rebel food business model: This model was invented by Rebel Food Private Limited
(Formerly Faasos). The model primarily focused on delivery and provided self-reliance
for orders and deliveries to start-ups (Maggo, 2018). The model differentiated itself with
multi-cuisine, multiple outlets, no storefront and a single kitchen. This model used data
intelligence to serve customers, analysing the customers' demographics, hyperlocal
demand-supply and the most popular cuisines. Additionally, the model established
different brands as independent brands, such as Behrouz Briyani, Oven Story and Slay
Coffee (Jain, 2021 ). They received orders online, and a single kitchen managed these
brands.
The Fresh Menu business model: This model had the features like a single kitchen,
single brand, multiple outlets and a storefront. In effect, this model combined a
restaurant and a cloud kitchen. The storefront helped customers see how the food was
being prepared. This model used an online ordering process to receive the orders. It
offered a mix of seasonal dishes and bestsellers to attract customers. The model had
two options to serve customers: delivery and take away. The model relied on
aggregators and self-reliance.
The Swiggy Access Business Model: This model, also called "Shell," had an optimally
located kitchen space. The model had the minimum infrastructure comprising gas
pipelines, drainage systems and ventilation systems. The restaurant used intelligence,
Swiggy's online delivery mechanism and delivery fleet to serve customers. Hence, the
restaurant did the cooking while Swiggy managed the delivery.
The Zomato Infrastructure Services: The model was based on the idea of a rented
kitchen. The kitchen had all the types of equipment and followed comprehensive
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processes to cook the food. Zomato shared all the know-how needed to run the
business. It also had a storefront where customers could walk in. The Zomato
Infrastructure Services offered features such as a multi-restaurant brand, rented
kitchens and a storefront.
The Kitopi Business Model: Founded in 2018, Kitopi had a mission to satisfy its
consumers' by delivering exceptional food, notably on customer terms. In this new
business model, the entrepreneur had the opportunity to outsource everything,
including the kitchen, call center operations and delivery. The entrepreneur had to
partner with Kitopi, and it would help them expand to different markets within 14 days.
Once the entrepreneur had signed an agreement, Kitopi took care of all the operations
such as sourcing the ingredients, cooking the food, packaging and safe delivery to the
customers. Kitopi managed the total customer experience and ensured that customers
were always happy. They used a Smart Kitchen Operating System (SKOS) technology
built in-house to ensure speed and efficiency in all business operations (Kitopi, 2022).
Post enlightening herself with this relevant literature on cloud-kitchen models, she
requested her husband to draw a comparison of cloud-kitchen business models. Her
husband created a table and listed out the main features of each model (Exhibit 4). After
reviewing the different cloud-kitchen business models, Bafna felt that the business models
did offer a beneficial opportunity to scale up her existing business. However, she was in a
dilemma in choosing the model best suited to her cause, given her existing resources,
external factors and current operational capacity.
Keywords:
Entrepreneurship,
Lean production,
Stakeholder management,
Corporate growth,
Small businesses
Notes
1. One US$ is equal to INR 65.09 on an average basis in 2017, retrieved from www.
exchangerates. org. uk/USD-I NR-spot-exchange-rates-h istory-201 7.html#:.~:text=Average%
20exchange%20rate%20in%202017%3A%2065.0966%20INR
2. A disease or a medical condition affects how a person lives, for example, obesity.
3. One US$ is equal to INR 74.13 on average basis in 2020, retrieved from www.
exchangerates.org.uk/USD-INR-spot-exchange-rates-history-2020.html#:~:text=Average%
20exchange%20rate%20in%202017%3A%2065.0966%20INR,
accessed on 30 May 2021.
4. One US$ is equal to INR 68.41 on average basis in 2018, retrieved from www.
exchangerates.org.uk/USD-INR-spot-exchange-rates-history-2018.html#:~·:text=Average%
20exchange%20rate%20in%202017%3A%2065.0966%20INR,
accessed on 30 May 2021.
5. One US$ is equal to INR 70.42 on average basis in 2019, retrieved from www.
exchangerates. org. uk/USD-INR-spot-exchange-rates-history-2019.html#:
-: text=Average%
20exchange%20rate%20in%202017%3A%2065.0966%20INR,
accessed on 30 May 2021.
6. One US$ is equal to INR 74.13 on average basis in 2020, retrieved from www.
exchangerates.org.uk/USD-INR-spot-exchange-rates-history-2020.html#:~:text=Average%
20exchange%20rate%20in%202017%3A%2065.0966%20INR,
accessed on 30 May 2021.
7. A gig employee is a freelancer or temporary worker who enters into a formal agreement with
companies to serve the company·s clients.
References
Bhatnagar, A. Bagri, K. Rai Gupta, R., & Kazmi, S. (2020). Who will win FoodTech's endgame?. Retrieved
from https://ajunioNc.com/foodtech-endgame-ubereats-acquisition-swiggy-zomato-amazon/ (accessed
20 May 2021).
Gahlaut, S. (2020). Future of the foodtech industry in upcoming years. Retrieved from https://yourstory.
com/2020/11/future-foodtech-industry-ai-apps/amp (accessed 18 May 2021 ).
Gupta, P. (2019). Zomato is now in 500 cities: an opportunity in every region thanks to mobile phones.
Retrieved from www.financialexpress.com/industry/sme/zomato-is-now-in-500-cities-an-opportunity-in-
every-region-thanks-to-mobile-phones/1661956/ (accessed 28 May 2021).
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Jain, A. (2021 ). How rebel foods is taking kitchen to the clouds. Retrieved from https://thestrategystory.
com/2021/05/08/rebel-foods-business-model/ (accessed 28 May 2021 ).
Kauer, I. (2019). Consumer trend towards healthier products: food and beverage manufacturers should
make healthier products more affordable. Financial Express, Retrieved from www.financialexpress.com/
lifestyle/health/more-and-more-indians-becoming-nutrition-conscious-than-ever-good-time-for-food-
and-beverage-manufacturers/1688847/ (accessed 19 July 2021 ).
Kitopi (2022). Our story. Retrieved from www.kitopi.com/our-story (accessed 28 May 2021 ).
Maggo, N. (2018). The 6 cloud kitchen business models and how they work. Retrieved from https://
limetray.com/blog/cloud-kitchen-business-model/ (accessed 28 May 2021 ).
Progressive Grocer Bureau (2020). Health conscious consumers focus on healthy meals for a fitter
future. Progressive Grocer India, Retrieved from www.indiaretailing.com/2020/12/04/food/food-gr
oc ery /heal th-conscious-consumers-focus-on-healthy-meals-for-a-fitter-future/#:~:
text= People%
20who%20eat%20a %20well, prod ucts%20Iike%20f ruits%20and%20vegetables
(accessed 19
July2021).
PTI (2020). India's food tech industry to grow at 25% CAGR to USO 8 billion by 2020 end. Retrieved
from www.newindianexpress.com/business/2020/jan/28/indias-food-tech-industry-to-grow-at-25-
per-cent-cagr-to-usd-8-billion-by-2022-end-2095694.html
(accessed 18 May 2021 ).
PTI (2020). India's food-tech industry to grow at 25pc CAGR to USO 8 billion by 2020 end: google - BCG
report. Retrieved from https://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/food-entertainment/food-
services/indias-food-tech-industry-to-grow-at-25-pc-cagr-to-usd-8-bn-by-2022-end-google-bcg-report/
73699084 (accessed 25 May 2021 ).
Singhi, A. Mathur, R., & Dhir, M. (2020). Demystifying the online food consumer: an $8 billion opportunity.
Retrieved from www.bcg.com/en-in/demystifying-the-online-food-consumer-an-8-billion-opportunity
(accessed 26 May 2021 ).
Soni, S. (2020). Discounts no longer biggest reason to order food from Zomato, Swiggy others; here's
what pulling users. Retrieved from www.financialexpress.com/industry/sme/online-foodtech-market-to-
grow-to-8-billion-by-2025-zomato-and-swiggy-foodtech-startups/1837844/ (accessed 25 May 2021 ).
Van Cuijk, L. (2015). Why it's important that healthy food is also tasty. Retrieved from https://
inlovewithhealth.com/en/slimming-tips-en/why-its-important-that-healthy-food-is-also-tasty/
(accessed
20 May 2021 ).
Correspondingauthor
Bikramjit Rishi can be contacted at: drbikramrishi@gmail.com
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Exhibit 1. KGS staff (2020)
Executive members
3
Salary@ INR 5000 (US$67.45) per month
Unit manager
Chefs
4
Logistics staff
15
Support staff
15
Salary and wages expenses in a month
Salary@ INR 10000 (US$134. 90) per month
Wages@ INR 5000 (US$67.45) per month
Wages@ INR 4000 (US$53.96) per month
Wages@ INR 3000 (US$40.47) per month
INR 150,000 (US$2023.47)
Notes: Chefs, logistics staff and support staff were not the permanent staff. They work part-time and paid wages based on their
contribution
Source: Company records
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Exhibit2. Menu of KGS
Salads
Mayonnaise Russian Salad
Matki Shel Salad
Mexi Crun Chinese Salad
Crunchy Traffic Lite Salad
Macaroni Salad
Soups
Tomato Basil Shorba Soup
Veg Minestrone Soup
Brocolli Cheddar Soup
Juices
Heart Beet (Beetroot, Pomegranate, Mosambi/Orange, Celery)
Pannzilla Smoothie
(Paan, Spinach, Tulsi, Apple/Pear, Lemon)
Fruit Punch
(Orange, Mosambi, Apple, Pineapple, Pomegranate, Watermelon)
Vital Greens
(Celery, Spinach, Lauki, Cucumber, Apple, Amla}
Carrot Craft
(Carrot, Apple, Beetroot, Mint, Mosambi)
ABC (Apple, Beetroot, Carrot, Celery, Amla)
Exotic K2S (Kale, Kiwi, Green Tea, Spinach, Pear, Mint)
Fruit Punch
(Orange, Mosambi, Apple. Pineapple, Pomegranate, Watermelon)
Green Glow
(Spinach, Mint, Pear, Coconut water, Green Spirulina)
Carrot Craft
(Carrot, Apple, Beetroot, Mint, Mosambi)
Note: The dominos basic pizza starts at INR 199 (US$2.83)
Source: Company records
Price
INR 110
(US$1.48}
INR 110
(US$1.48)
INR 110
(US$1.48)
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Exhibit3. Financialdata
2017
2018
2019
2020
Average fixed
costs
(Annual)
Water
electricity
charges
(Annual)
Transportation
charges
(Monthly)
Raw materials
(Monthly
Charges)
Number of
orders placed
per day
INR 10,000(US$153.63)
INR 10,000
(US$153.63)
INR 7,000 (US$107.54)
INR 8,000
(US$122.90)
20
INR 12,000
(US$175.41)
INR 10,000
(US$146.18)
INR 7,000
(US$102.32)
INRS,000
(US$116.94)
30
INR 15,000
(US$213.03)
INR 11,000
(US$156.22)
INR8,000
(US$113.62)
INR9,000
(US$127.82)
60
INR 22,000
(US$296.77)
INR 11,000
US$(148.39)
INRS,000
(US$107.91)
INR9,000
(US$121.40)
75
Total revenue
generated
INR 67,300
(US$998.61)
INR101,120
(US$1461.77)
INR 201,440
(US$2840.50)
INR 251,920
(US$3372.45)
Revenue
calculation
20 (orders)' 30 (Number of
days in a month)' 110
(Average price per order)+
Commission (INR 500) +
Sauce Sale (INR 800)
30 (orders)* 30 (Number of
days in a month)' 110
(Average price per order) +
Commission (INR 1000)+
Sauce Sale (INR 1120)
Source: Created by Authors based on the discussions with the protagonist
60 (orders)' 30 (Number of
days in a month)' 110
(Average price per order)+
Commission (INR 2,000)+
Sauce Sale (INR 1440)
75 (orders)' 30 (Number of
days in a month)' 110
(Average price per order)+
Commission (INR 2500) +
Sauce Sale (INR 1920)
I I VOL.12 NO.2 2022 EMERALDEMERGINGMARKETSCASESTUDIES PAGE9
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3.2 Page 22 |
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3.3 Page 23 |
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Exhibit 4. Types of cloud kitchen business models
Cloud-kitchen business model
The independent cloud kitchen
The rebel food business model
The fresh menu business model
The Swiggy access business model
The Zomato infrastructure services business model
The kitopi business model
Source: Created by Authors
Features
One brand, one kitchen, no storefront
No storefront, multi-brand, one kitchen, multiple outlets
One brand, one kitchen, multiple outlets with a storefront
Aggregator owned, no storefront, multi-brand, rented co-working kitchens
Aggregator owned, rented kitchens, multi-brand, with a storefront
Cooking and delivery fully outsourced
I I PAGE10 EMERALDEMERGINGMARKETSCASESTUDIES VOL 12 NO.2 2022
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3.4 Page 24 |
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