

FACULTY OF COMMERCE, HUMAN SCIENCES AND EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE

QUALIFICATION: BACHELOR OF ECONOMICS HONOURS				
QUALIFICATION CODE: 08BECH	LEVEL: 8			
COURSE CODE: IEC820S	COURSE NAME: INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS			
SESSION: NOVEMBER 2024	PAPER: THEORY			
DURATION: 3 HOURS	MARKS: 100			

FIRST OPPORTUNITY EXAMINATION QUESTION PAPER				
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MODERATOR:	Dr E. Tingum			

	INSTRUCTIONS		
1.	Answer ALL the questions.		
2.	Write clearly and neatly.		
3.	Number the answers clearly.		

PERMISSIBLE MATERIALS

- 1. Pens/pencils
- 2. Calculator
- 3. Ruler

THIS QUESTION PAPER CONSISTS OF 7 PAGES (including this front page)

QUESTION 1 [10 Marks]

Select the letter that best represents your answer.

- A market with few entry barriers and with many firms that sell differentiated products is:
- a) A) purely competitive.
- b) A monopoly.
- c) Monopolistically competitive.
- d) Oligopolistic.
- e) None of the answers above is correct.
- 2. When average total cost is at a minimum,
- a) Marginal cost is also at a minimum.
- b) The firm is experiencing constant returns to scale.
- c) Marginal cost is constant.
- d) Average cost is equal to marginal cost.
- e) The firm is maximizing its profit.
- Oligopoly differs from other forms of market structure (monopoly and perfect competition) because
- a) Firms frequently engage in collusion.
- b) Firms are protected by high barriers to entry.
- c) Firms' decisions have direct effects on their rivals' profits.
- d) Firms' price decisions are extremely limited.
- e) All of the answers above are correct.

- 4. Which of the following is true for both perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive firms in the long run?
- a) P = MC.
- b) MC = ATC.
- c) P > MR.
- e) Profit equals zero
- e) Sells differentiated products.
- 5. The Cournot model concludes that the equilibrium price in a duopoly will be
- a) The same as the monopoly price.
- b) Higher than the monopoly price.
- c) Lower than the competitive-industry price.
- d) Set by collusive agreement between the firms.
- e) Between the competitive-industry price and the monopoly price.
- In the Cournot model of quantity competition, as the number of firms increases, total industry output
- a) Declines asymptotically.
- b) Grows indefinitely.
- c) Approaches the equilibrium output of perfect competition.
- d) Approaches the profit-maximizing output of a pure monopoly.
- e) Approaches the output of a cartel.
- 7. The model of the kinked demand curve implies that
- a) Strong brand loyalty means there is little incentive for firms to cut price.
- b) Free entry will eventually reduce economic profits to zero.
- c) A firm's competitors will follow it in a price decrease but not in a price increase.
- d) Firms will coordinate prices so as to maximize group profit.
- e) Rivals will match any price increases but tend to ignore any price cuts a firm makes.

8. The model of the kinked demand curve is used to explain

- a) Advertising battles to build brand loyalty.
- b) Sales maximization.
- c) Price wars.
- d) Sticky prices in oligopolies.
- e) Collusive price agreements.

9. Under Bertrand competition,

- a) The firm setting the higher price attains a low market share.
- b) The firm setting the lower price claims the entire market.
- c) The total output supplied by the firms determines the market price.
- d) Firms compete on multiple dimensions: quantity, price, and advertising.
- e) Firms face kinked demand curves.

10. In the paradigm of the prisoner's dilemma,

- a) Participants' interests are strictly opposed.
- b) Neither side has a dominant strategy.
- c) Pursuit of each person's self-interest leads to a poor group outcome.
- d) Cooperation is achieved by the freedom to communicate.
- e) None of the answers above is correct.

QUESTION 2 [25 Marks]

1. A firm's total cost function is given by the equation:

 $TC = 4000 + 5Q + 10Q^2$.

Write an expression for each of the following cost concepts:

- (a) Total Variable Cost (2)
- (b) Average Variable Cost (2)
- (c) Average Total Cost (2)
- (d) Marginal Cost (2)
- 2. Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, C(q) = 40q. Assume the demand curve for the industry is given by P = 100 Q and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor.
 - (a) Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, if each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given. First, find the reaction function for each firm; then solve for price and quantity. (12)
 - (b) What are the profits of each firm? (2)
 - (c) Define the Cournot model. (3)

QUESTION 3 [25 Marks]

- Amore and Joana Airlines (AJ Airlines) fly only one route: Windhoek-Oranjemund. The demand for each flight is Q = 500 - P. AJ Airlines' cost of running each flight is N\$30,000 plus N\$100 per passenger.
 - (a) What is the profit-maximizing price that AJ Airlines will charge? How many people will be on each flight? What is AJ Airlines' profit for each flight? (10)
 - (b) AJ Airlines find out that two different types of people fly to Oranjemund from Windhoek. Type A consists of business people with a demand of $Q_A = 260 0.4P$. Type B consists of NUST Geology and Mining Engineering students who have to travel regularly for their practical learning. Their total demand is $Q_B = 240 0.6P$. Because the students are easy to spot, AJ Airlines decide to charge them different prices.
 - i. How many people of each type are on each flight? What price should AJ Airlines charge the students? What price should it charge other customers? (10)
 - ii. What would AJ Airlines' profit be for each flight? (3)
 - (c) Do you think that it is a good idea for AJ Airlines to use price discrimination? (2)

QUESTION 4 [40 Marks]

1. Two computer firms, A and B, are planning to market network systems for office information management. Each firm can develop either a fast, high-quality system (High), or a slower, low-quality system (Low). Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix:

		Firm B		
		High	Low	
Firm A	High	50, 40	60, 45	
	Low	55, 55	15, 20	

- (a) If both firms make their decisions at the same time and follow *maximin* (low-risk) strategies, what will the outcome be? (12)
- (b) Suppose that both firms try to maximize profits, but that Firm A has a head start in planning and can commit first. Now what will be the outcome? (4)
- (c) What will be the outcome if Firm B has the head start in planning and can commit first? (4)
- 2. Briefly describe the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. (10)
- 3. Define tying as a pricing strategy and briefly discuss its benefits. (10)

TOTAL = 100 MARKS